In many important political problems, citizens can directly participate in the decision making through a referendum. Examples include accession to international organizations (EU, Euro monetary union) or Quebec's independence referendum. These settings are often characterized by uncertainty over the future consequences of the decision, the possibility of (at least partial) learning about these consequences over time before a decision, and irreversibility once a decision is made by the electorate.
Introduction
In many countries, fundamental changes in the political structure or important international agreements require the consent of a majority of voters in a referendum. There are many important examples, such as the potential adoption of the Euro in Sweden (where a referendum was held in 2003 and the proposal was defeated) or in Britain (where a referendum is expected but has not yet been scheduled). Other examples include Quebec's 1995 referendum on independence, and several Eastern European countries that held referenda on whether they should join the European Union.
The gatekeeping authority that can call the referendum and which we will call the "government" or "politician" usually has preferences that differ from those of the median voter. In Quebec, for instance, the decision whether to call a referendum on the question of independence from Canada was made by Jacques Parizeau, the leader of the strongly pro-independence Bloc Quebecois and prime minister of Quebec at the time. Similarly, the decision whether and when to call a referendum on the adoption of the Euro in Britain or Sweden lies with the respective governments. During the campaign, the government is usually heavily involved in the "Yes" campaign (i.e., in favor of changing the status quo), indicating their preferences. 1 Suppose that the government needs a majority to change the status quo and has the power to decide on the timing of the referendum. At first sight, it might seem that the ability to decide on timing gives real power (in the sense of being able to implement a policy against the interests of the median voter) only to a government that is negatively biased relative to the median voter against the project, because the politician can delay the referendum until even she herself regards the project as worthwhile. On the other hand, it would seem that a positively biased government cannot enforce the implementation of a project as long as the median voter opposes it. Consequently, one would think that for a positively biased government there lies little benefit in controlling the timing of the referendum.
However, we show that this intuition is correct only in a setting where each voter's opinion on the project does not change over time and there is no learning about the merits of the project over time. Often, questions decided by referenda are characterized by considerable uncertainty over the future consequences of the decision, by the possibility of -at least partial -learning about these consequences as time passes, and by the irreversibility (or very costly reversibility) of the decision once it has been taken by the electorate. Consider the question whether Britain should adopt the Euro. There exist many predictions about the positive or negative consequences of Britain joining the Euro zone. So clearly there is considerable uncertainty for citizens regarding the consequences. Observing what happens in other Euro zone countries for some time will enable British voters to learn before they make a decision. At the same time, it is clear that first joining the Euro, then learning about the consequences, and finally leaving in case of an unfavorable outcome would be very costly indeed, since the conversion cost cannot be recovered and would be incurred twice.
Our model captures these features and highlights a more sophisticated channel through which a government that is positively biased has the power to implement a project earlier than preferred by the median voter. We analyze how the optimal timing decision depends on the bias of the politician and the political environment more generally. A society has the option to implement a project; if society chooses to do so, each voter has to pay a cost and then starts receiving a stream of payoffs. These payoffs are composed of a common and an idiosyncratic component, where the latter captures the notion that voters differ in their preferences towards the project. Regarding the future common payoff, we assume that it follows a Brownian motion. This means that waiting with the decision to implement the project yields additional valuable information and generates an option value of waiting. As with investment problems, this leads to an optimal threshold for each voter that is higher than the point where she just breaks even in expectation. This optimal threshold is increasing in the variance of future pay-offs.
A politician with a positive bias, who is more inclined towards the project than the median voter, thus has a lower threshold value than the median and would like to implement the project at a lower value of the common payoff than the median voter. It turns out that the crucial condition for the politician to be able to impose her will on the median voter is whether she can commit not to call another referendum, in case the first referendum fails. If commitment is possible, the politician can effectively eliminate the option value of waiting for the median voter. As long as the median voter breaks even in expectation without the option value, she will vote in favor of the project in the referendum, even though she would have preferred to wait before making the decision.
Commitment to a considerable delay after a failure in a first referendum is essential in order for the politician to be able to implement a policy that is better for her than the median voter's preferred policy. In other words, in our model it is not that "respect for the decision of the voters" prevents the politician from trying again after a rejected referendum, but rather commitment is the optimal strategy for the politician. This may explain the (otherwise strange) fact that, very often, no new referendum is called after a rejection of the proposal in a first referendum, even though the result was very narrowso that there appears to be a potential for a reversal -and the same government remains in power and should be inclined to call a new referendum. 2 We also consider extensions of our model that introduce further uncertainty. As a first step towards generalization, we analyze the effects that arise when the politician does not exactly know the preference parameter of the median voter. We show that this mitigates the politician's urge to hold the referendum early. One important implication of this case is that referenda can be lost, as they sometimes are in reality. We then consider an additional source of uncertainty, namely the risk for the politician of losing her gatekeeper position. We show that this type of uncertainty induces a positively biased politician to call a referendum earlier than in the basic case. Taken together, both generalizations imply that uncertainty increases the probability that referenda are rejected.
Our paper is related to different strands of literature. There is, of course, a large literature on each of the different "projects" that we envision the referenda in our model to be about. From optimal currency and free trade areas to political unions, each has been analyzed in its own right. The literature on the formation and size of unions -see Bolton, Roland, and Spolaore (1996) for a survey -may come closest in spirit to our analysis. Alesina and Spolaore (1997) , for example, analyze the determinants of the number and size of nations and find that democracy leads to secessions and that the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the degree of economic integration. Our model complements this literature in the following way: On the one hand, our model is simpler in that we do not explicitly model a particular application (like entry into a currency union or the formation or break-up of nations) and how the costs and benefits of such a project depend on parameters. On the other hand, this simplification allows us to study new questions in more detail that have not been dealt with in the previous literature. In particular, we can study in more detail the role of learning about a project over time, the internal political process in the presence of disagreement over the project, and their joint influence on the timing of the decision.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first formal model of the decision when to call a referendum. A related issue is the timing of elections. The only formal work in political science (that we are aware of) concerned with this question is Smith (1996 Smith ( , 2003 who analyzes the decision of the government in parliamentary democracies such as Britain or Canada whether to call an early election. Smith studies an asymmetric information setting in which the government has more information on its ability or the economic development in the next time period. The main motivation for the government in his model to call an early election is to preempt the revelation of unfavorable information. However, rational voters take early elections as a negative sign in this asymmetric information setting and become more critical towards the government. While our model has uncertainty about the payoffs, we have a setting in which information is symmetric so that no suspicion effect arises when the government calls a referendum. 3 government until the summer of 2003) never tried to call another referendum. Our model suggests a possible answer, namely that commitment to (some) waiting time before the next referendum is essential for the politician.
3 Moreover, even if the government had more information about the future development of pay-offs than Our paper is also related to the literature on proposer, or agenda setting power, following the seminal contribution by Romer and Rosenthal (1978) . In models of proposer power with horizontally differentiated preferences, usually on the interval [0, 1], the power of the proposer depends on the relative positions of the status quo, the median voter, and the proposer herself. We analyze a similar question, albeit the decision is binary in our model, but in a dynamic setting which gives rise to learning opportunities. Technically, our model draws on the literature on investment under uncertainty and real options. Contributions to this literature include McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Abel and Eberly (1994) ; see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an introduction. Like in that literature, an important effect in our model is the option value of waiting when there is learning over time about the benefit of investment. The main difference between that literature and our model is that in investment problems, there is just a single decision maker whose objective it usually is to maximize profit. In our model, different individuals (including the politician) have different preferences over the implementation of the project, and hence about the optimal duration of learning. Moreover, the politician is in a position to manipulate voters' option value of waiting by calling a referendum and committing to not calling a referendum again (at least for some time) if the present attempt should fail.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we will present and discuss the basic model. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4 discusses extensions of the basic model. The last section concludes.
The model

Formal setup
A society has the option to implement a project. In accordance with the examples in the introduction, the project can be thought of as entering the European Union, Britain or Sweden adopting the Euro as currency, or Quebec declaring its independence from Canada.
If the project is undertaken at time t * , it generates a net payoff of v(t) + b i for voter i in all periods t > t * . v(t) is referred to as the common payoff (equal for all individuals), while b i is voter i's idiosyncratic bias towards the project. Without loss of generality, we can consider v(t) as the benefit of the median voter (i.e., we normalize the median b in society to 0). Voters with above-average benefits from the project have a positive b, while those with below-average benefits have a negative b. Undertaking the project requires an investment of C on the part of each voter. voters in our model, this would not necessarily lead to the same "distrust" effect as in Smith, because voters' and the government's interest are aligned with respect to the future developments of payoffs (i.e., if the government knows that future payoffs from the project will go down, it is also less interested in implementing the project now).
The future development of v is uncertain. Specifically, we assume that v follows a Brownian motion without drift:
Here, dv is the change of v over a short time interval, and dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process. A Wiener process has the property that its increment after t units of time is a normally distributed random variable with expected value 0 and variance t; it can be interpreted as the continuous time limit of a random walk. The parameter γ just multiplies the standard increment (so that the variance of v in t periods is γ 2 t) and hence measures the amount of uncertainty about the future payoffs of the project. The assumption that v changes randomly over time is made to capture the notion that future payoffs are uncertain, but correlated over time. For example, if adopting the Euro gives a high average payoff today, it will likely also give a high payoff tomorrow.
We assume in the basic model that, once the project is implemented, it generates payoffs for all following time periods (i.e. the project implementation is irreversible). 4 Hence, if the project is implemented at time t, voter i's expected net benefit is
where δ is the discount factor. Sometimes, it is useful to work with the instantaneous interest rate ρ = ln(1/δ), where ρ is defined such that δ dt = 1 − ρdt for small intervals dt. A deterministic component in the payoffs that accrue to all citizens could be easily incorporated in this model framework. For example, suppose that citizens adapt to the project and are able to receive larger payoffs after some time of learning; this is exactly equivalent to a decrease of the implementation cost and does not affect the results in a qualitative way.
The political decision process is as follows. The decision to implement the project is made through a referendum in which voters face a binary decision (yes or no). However, the decision whether a referendum is called is made by an individual who may have different preferences than the median voter; we call this agent the "politician", and his preference parameter b p . The politician makes the timing decision in order to maximize his own expected utility.
Discussion of the model
Consider, for example, the adoption of the Euro in Britain. There are general costs and benefits for the whole country, for example, how does the ECB control inflation and employment as compared to an alternative regime where the Bank of England continues to manage monetary policy for Britain independently. Moreover, cost and benefits are different for different voters. The benefits depend, for example, on how much voter i travels to countries in the Euro zone, and therefore how much he benefits from not having to exchange money for such trips. Also, if Britain adopts the Euro, people would have to learn new prices for all goods, and some voters might find adjusting to new prices easier than others. 5 Also, they may have differing sentimental attachments to the pound, or some might just dislike foreign control over monetary policy (for reasons that have nothing to do with the actual monetary decisions of the ECB).
In the formal model, we reduce heterogeneity among voters to the benefit dimension, while we assume that costs are equal for all voters. This is not a crucial assumption and just made for mathematical convenience. The important part is that voters differ in their opinion about the desirability of the project.
An important assumption is that the distribution of benefits of the project is given exogenously; there cannot be a redistribution scheme that taxes and subsidizes voters differentially in order to redistribute the benefits. This appears quite reasonable for the applications discussed, as a substantial extent of the payoff difference between people is not due to economic considerations, but rather to unobservable preference heterogeneity. For example, it would not be possible to pay different amounts of money as compensation for different learning costs, if the Euro was introduced in Britain.
Finally, we assume that the politician who decides on the timing of the referendum follows his own objectives when he makes that decision. Implicitly, calling the referendum is not the only (or even main) task that the politician performs, and therefore it is quite conceivable that the election for the politician's position was won by a candidate who does not share the median voter's preferences in the question of the project.
Results
The citizens' view
As a preliminary step, consider the following question: If a citizen with preference parameter b could individually choose the value threshold above which the project will be implemented, what threshold would be chosen? Note that the future development of the payoffs depends only on the value of v today, and hence the problem has a timeindependent threshold. This is essentially an investment problem where the "investor" has to keep in mind the option value of waiting. Let v * b denote the optimal threshold for the individual with preference parameter b. She implements the project as soon as v ≥ v * b . Once the project is implemented, she receives the following expected discounted payoff (remember that the random process has no drift, so
As long as v(t) is less than v * b , on the other hand, she forgoes implementation and prefers to wait.
Before we determine the optimal value v * b , for a type b citizen it is helpful to analyze the problem for some general implementation thresholdṽ. Let F b (v,ṽ) denote the expected discounted continuation utility, if investment is made when v(t) =ṽ for the first time and today's state is v <ṽ. At date t + dt, the value of v will have changed, so F b (·,ṽ) must satisfy the following equation (for small dt):
for all v(t) <ṽ, i.e. in the waiting interval. To calculate E(F b (v(t + dt),ṽ)), we can take a Taylor expansion (where we suppress the time argument of v(t) and let the prime denote the derivative with respect to the first argument):
Using (1), we know that
Note that the variance of v is linear in dt and therefore the last term on the right hand side of (5) cannot be discarded even in a first order Taylor expansion with respect to dt. This observation is called Ito's Lemma. 6 Using this information in (4) and rearranging, we get
We will now turn to the boundary conditions for this differential equation. For any giveñ v, it must be true that
As v grows very negative, it becomes extremely improbable that the project can be implemented in the foreseeable future and payoffs that accrue only far in the future are discounted heavily. The solution of (6), taking into account the boundary condition (7), is
where K b depends on the implementation thresholdṽ and is defined by the so-called value matching condition:
This boundary condition requires that, as v approaches the investment thresholdṽ, the continuation value F must approach the value on the right hand side, which is the pay-off if the project is implemented.
We are now in a position to solve for the optimal implementation threshold v * b . Looking for the optimal v * b is equivalent to maximizing F b (v,ṽ) overṽ, where K b (ṽ) is defined by (9) and v is taken as given. The resulting first order condition is:
We see that the derivative of F at the optimal implementation threshold (the LHS) must equal the derivative of the implementation pay-off (the RHS). This result is called the "smooth pasting" condition in the literature on investment under uncertainty. Intuitively, the derivatives cannot differ because otherwise the expected pay-off from waiting would not equal the implementation pay-off as implied by value matching. Using (9) and (10) to solve for v * b we obtain:
We see that at her individually optimal threshold the pay-off for an individual, v * b + b, is equal to the annuitized cost, ρC, plus the term
which can be interpreted as the benefit of waiting. Note that the more uncertain the future development of v (i.e., the larger γ) and the lower the time preference (i.e., the lower ρ), the larger is the benefit of waiting.
For future reference, we note that
Before turning our attention to the politician's problem, it is useful to summarize graphically the results we have obtained so far. 
The politician's problem
Let us now turn to the problem of the politician, who can decide on whether to hold a referendum and when, but requires a majority in order for the project to be implemented.
Figure 1: Continuation and Implementation Value
We view the politician as a citizen candidate in the sense that she seeks to maximize her own preferences, characterized by the idiosyncratic bias b p , rather than some form of social welfare.
It is easy to see that, if b p < 0, i.e. if the politician is more critical of the project than the median voter, the politician will call a referendum exactly when v(t) reaches v * bp as given by (11). In other words, the politician is unconstrained by the requirement that a majority has to vote affirmative on the referendum: Since the politician is more critical of the proposal than the median voter, the majority certainly thinks that the project should be implemented when (even) the politician finds that the project is worthwhile.
The more complicated and interesting case is to analyze what happens when the politician has a positive bias towards the project (b p > 0). For example, in the Quebec independence referendum or the Swedish Euro referendum, the government certainly had a positive bias relative to the median voter. In general, it is likely that this case appears more often than the case of a negative bias among those projects for which a referendum is actually called, because, if the politician is not keen on a project, then it is less likely to be proposed.
In this case, we have to specify in greater detail what happens if the result of the referendum is negative. There are two (basic) possibilities: First, a new referendum might be scheduled until eventually one succeeds. Alternatively, there will be no further referenda and if the initial referendum was not successful the project will never be implemented.
We briefly consider the first possibility. If there are potentially many referenda, there will always be another opportunity to implement the project and hence there is an option value to waiting. Consider the voter who is indifferent between implementing the project now and waiting. From (11), it is the voter whose critical value b ind 1 is given by
Every voter with a higher b will vote in favor of adoption, and every voter with a lower b will vote against it. The referendum will be successful if b ind 1 ≤ 0, and a majority votes for adoption. The project will thus be implemented when, for the first time, v(t) ≥ v * b=0 , which is the time preferred by the voter with the median value of b.
In the second scenario, when the decision on the project is now-or-never, there is no option value to waiting. Voters consider whether their net benefit from the implementation of the project, as given by (3), is negative or positive. The indifferent voter in this scenario is thus characterized by b
The politician needs to ensure that b ind 2 ≤ 0 at the time when he calls the (one and only) referendum. Otherwise the proposal will fail and the project will never be implemented.
Since b ind 2 < b ind 1 , more people vote for the implementation of the project when the decision is cast as "now or never" than when the decision is about "now or later". This is intuitive, as there is a value to delaying the decision in order to learn more in the first but not in the second scenario. Hence, if the politician has a positive bias in favor of the project, he prefers to cast the question as "now or never", because this enables him to call a successful referendum earlier than would be possible without commitment. We summarize this finding in the following proposition. This result may explain some otherwise striking behavior after failed referenda. For example, consider the 1996 Quebec independence referendum which failed very narrowly (49.4% supported independence). It would appear at least conceivable that there could be a majority for independence if the same question was asked again, and since the Bloc Quebecois remained in power in the provincial government of Quebec until 2003, they could have scheduled a new referendum any time, but chose not to. Proposition 1 indicates at least an advantage of committing to not repeating a referendum after a potential failure: It destroys the value of waiting for the median voter, and may induce her to agree to the politician's project before the median's optimal threshold is reached.
In practice, the politician may not be able to commit to never calling a referendum again. Moreover, if there is uncertainty about the preference of the median voter, then it may not be optimal for the politician to commit to never repeating a failed referendum, because a referendum may actually fail. 7 Still, the politician can only induce a majority to vote for the project before the median's optimal threshold is reached if she can commit to at least some time period during which no referendum would be held, if the present referendum fails. Hence, commitment is essential for a positively biased politician to have any power from his proposer status.
Let us now investigate the case with commitment in greater detail. Consider
], that is, the politician's bias in favor of the project is smaller than the benefit of learning. This type of politician is unconstrained by the requirement to win a majority and calls the referendum as soon as v(t) ≥ v * bp . 8 To see this, suppose the curve depicted in Figure 1 represents the median voter, i.e. b = 0. By calling the referendum, the politician forces the median voter to forgo the option value of waiting and decide based solely on the expected discounted pay-off. That is, the threshold for the median voter is now the horizontal intercept of the implementation value at ρC. The respective curve (not shown) of the politician resembles the curve of the median voter, only that it is shifted to the left by b p . Since this shift to the left falls short of the option value of waiting (remember that
) the optimal threshold of the politician v * bp must lie to the right of the decision threshold of the median voter at ρC. The approval of the median voter is therefore no binding constraint because whenever v(t) ≥ v * bp it also exceeds ρC. Now consider the case where
, in other words, the politician's bias exceeds the option value of waiting. Contrary to the previous case, the threshold of the politician now lies to the left of the decision threshold of the median voter. The need to win approval in the referendum thus poses a binding constraint and the politician will call the referendum only when v(t) ≥ ρC, that is, as soon as the median voter's net benefit is zero (or slightly positive).
We collect our findings in the following proposition:
calls the referendum as soon as
does so as soon as v(t) ≥ ρC.
In both cases the referendum is successful and the project is implemented earlier than is optimal for the median voter.
It is interesting to note that the source of proposer power for a positively biased politician is entirely the option value of learning (and the politician's ability to destroy this option value with a now-or-never referendum). To see this, consider a situation in which γ = 0, i.e. the payoffs don't change over time. In this situation, all voters know exactly whether they will win or lose from the project, independent of when the proposal is implemented. It is then clear that a positively biased politician can only successfully implement the project when the median voter benefits from the project (and therefore
Figure 2: Median value as function of politician's bias also wants to implement it right away). On the other hand, the larger is γ, the larger is the range of biased politicians that are unconstrained by the fact that they need majority approval for the project. From a utilitarian welfare perspective, the project is implemented suboptimally early, if the median is close to the average. 9 This inefficient outcome arises because the politician, endowed with agenda-setting power, forces the median voter to forgo the option value of waiting and achieves an outcome that is closer to her own preferences.
Let us evaluate the outcome from the perspective of the median voter. How does her continuation or implementation value depend on the bias of the politician? Figure 2 addresses this question. Clearly, b p = 0 is always a maximum (independent of v(t)), as the politician then implements the median voter's optimum. When the politician is biased, we see that as long as the current value v(t) exceeds or equals the threshold of the median voter (the upper two curves) she is well served by a positively biased politician because both of them favor immediate implementation. For v(t) ∈ (ρC, v * b=0 ), the positively biased politician still wins the referendum and implements the project, however, the median voter loses some of her option value as she would prefer to wait but is not allowed this option. As soon as v(t) ≤ ρC, a positively biased politician is worse than any negatively biased one, because the former implements when the median's expected discounted pay-off is zero.
In general, these considerations raise the question of why the politician should be biased relative to the median voter. While a simple median voter model of the politician's 9 When we change the welfare criterion to Pareto optimality, it is clear that any relevant implementation threshold is necessarily Pareto optimal: If the politician can implement his optimal threshold without being constrained, then any change would decrease the politician's utility; if the politician is constrained by the requirement that the median voter votes for the proposal, then the median voter's preferred threshold lies at a higher level of v while the politician's preferred threshold lies at a lower value of v; again, it is clear that no Pareto improvement is feasible.
election would imply that a citizen who has the median voter's preferences concerning the project will be elected as politician, there are reasons why the politician may in reality have positive or negative bias. First, the politician usually has more tasks; often, the power to call the referendum is not even one of the more important task for the politician, and so a politician with non-median preferences concerning the project may very well get elected. 10 Second, if there is a third party outside the electorate that is interested in whether the referendum passes and can influence the payoffs, then the optimal action for the median voter in the electorate may actually be to vote for a politician who does not have the median's preferences. Consider the case of Quebec: Given that a party that was strongly for independence was in power throughout the 1990s, so that the possibility of a referendum was always looming at the horizon, the Canadian federal government was quite willing to give all sorts of subsidies to Quebec in order to keep Quebecers happy in Canada. Hence, voting for a relatively extreme party may have actually been optimal for the median voter.
Extensions
In this section, we analyze three extensions of the basic model. First, we look at the case that the identity of the median voter is unknown; this provides a setting in which there is a risk for proposals to fail. Second, we consider what happens when there is the risk for the politician of losing office and combine these two forms of uncertainty. In subsection 4.3, we analyze the implication of our model on referenda which are initiated not by a politician, but rather by popular demand (so-called initiatives).
Uncertainty about the median voter
Suppose that the politician is no longer sure about the exact preferences of the median voter and consequently faces the risk of losing the referendum when she calls it. Assume that the politician believes that the median voter's preference is distributed according to the cumulative density Ψ(·). Since a referendum called at value v will succeed if and only if
− c ≥ 0, the probability of a successful referendum at v is 1 − Ψ(ρC − v). It is convenient to denote this success probability by P (v); note that P (·) is an increasing function of v. Let H(v,ṽ) denote the continuation value of the politician if her implementation threshold isṽ. As before, this value function has to satisfy the following differential equation:
10 In general, the citizen candidate literature (see Osborne and Slivinski (1996) , Besley and Coate (1997)) provides models in which non-median candidates often get elected.
The solution to this equation takes the now familiar form:
where we have made use of the boundary condition lim v→−∞ H(v,ṽ) = 0, and where K(ṽ) is defined by the following value matching condition:
The RHS of (13) represents the expected pay-off from calling the referendum at v(t) =ṽ, that is, the probability that it is successful times the expected (with respect to the future) discounted implementation value.
We are now in a position to characterize the politician's optimal implementation threshold for this case. Maximizing H(v,ṽ) overṽ subject to (13) results in the following first order condition:
The RHS of this condition must be positive as P (ṽ) is positive and the payoff at the optimal threshold must be positive. Hence the LHS must also be positive which implies that the optimal threshold v * exceeds ρC +
− b p , the optimal threshold in the basic case.
Proposition 3. The optimal threshold of the politician under uncertainty with respect to the median voter is greater than in the basic case.
Of course, if the politician is still positively biased compared to the realized median, her optimal threshold must still be smaller than the median's optimum.
Note that, if the politician is uncertain about the median voter's preference, referenda are lost with probability 1 − P (v * ) > 0. This feature enhances the empirical appeal of our model, as in reality referenda happen to fail on occasion. 11
Timing with risk of losing the proposer status
We now return to the assumption that the median's position is known, but assume that the politician can schedule a referendum only as long as she holds power, and that she may eventually lose power. In particular, the loss of power is modeled as a Poisson process with arrival rate λ. If the proposer loses power, she will be replaced by the median voter who then schedules the referendum according to our analysis in the basic model.
Consider first a politician who is negatively biased against the project. It is quite clear that any type b p < 0 behaves exactly as in the basic model: When v reaches the value threshold from the model without power loss possibility, it is clearly optimal for the politician to call a referendum (rather than wait further). Similarly, when v(t) < v * (b p ), the politician has to fear losing power and, connected with this, a too early implementation (from the politician's point of view), but it does not help against this problem to call an early referendum as long as the politician remains in power. For the rest of this section, we therefore consider the more interesting case of a positively biased politician.
The utility of the politician if she loses office without having called a referendum is given by F bp (v, v * b=0 ) for all v ≤ v * b=0 . As long as she is in power, we denote her value function by G (v,ṽ, λ) , whereṽ is the (not necessarily optimal) threshold at which she calls a referendum. In what follows, we will suppress the latter two arguments of G(·) when no confusion arises. For values of v, for which the politician prefers to wait, the following condition must hold:
The right hand side represents the discounted value of the politician's expected payoff at t + dt: Either, she is still in power (with probability (1 − λ)dt) and receives
or (with probability λdt) she loses power within the next small interval of length dt and receives the continuation utility F bp (v(t + dt) , v * b=0 ). Letting dt go to zero and neglecting all terms of order higher than 1 in dt yields the following differential equation:
This differential equation has the general solution
where K 2 must be zero since lim v→−∞ G(v,ṽ, λ) = 0 for anyṽ and λ. We are now in a position to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 4. The optimal (unconstrained) implementation threshold of the politician decreases in λ. In particular, this threshold is lower than in the basic model.
Proof. Since value matching must hold at the implementation threshold, it is sufficient to show that G (v,ṽ, λ) is decreasing in λ. Consider an increase in λ, say from λ 1 to λ 2 > λ 1 .
we have
The second claim in the proposition follows immediately from the observation that the basic model corresponds to the special case of λ = 0.
Proposition 4 states that the higher the risk of losing power, the earlier a positively biased politician would want to call the referendum. The intuition for this result is clear, because the value of waiting is diminished by the risk of losing power.
Note that the politician is still possibly constrained by the fact that she needs a majority in the referendum, i.e. v * ≥ ρC. As λ increases, the (unconstrained) optimal threshold for the politician decreases, so that for increased λ more types of politicians become constrained and will call the referendum at the first time when it gets a bare majority. If a type b politician is already constrained for some λ = λ 0 , then further increases in λ to λ 1 > λ 0 do not decrease the referendum threshold any further.
It is also interesting to combine both types of uncertainty treated seperately above. That is, what happens if the politician risks losing power and does not exactly know the median? To understand this case, we have to combine the results from the previous subsections. Analytically, this means combining equation (17) and the value matching condition (13). As before, we cannot find a closed form solution. Furthermore, the combined effect on the optimal threshold is clearly ambiguous: The risk of losing power reduces the threshold whereas the uncertainty about the median voter increases it.
Despite this ambiguity, we can deduce one further interesting insight. Start with uncertainty about the median voter. As we saw above, under this scenario referenda are lost with probability 1 − P (v * ) > 0. Now, suppose that in addition, the politician faces the risk of losing power. As we showed above this tends to reduce his optimal threshold. As v * decreases and P (.) is increasing, the probability that a referendum is lost increases. In other words, the more political uncertainty there is, the higher the probability that referenda are lost.
Initiatives
In several jurisdictions (e.g. California, Italy, Switzerland, Bavaria) special types of referenda, so-called initiatives, can be initiated upon popular demand if a certain percentage of the population requests a referendum. In this section we want to analyze how this form of referendum differs from the type we have considered so far, where a politician acted as the gatekeeper. In particular, we investigate the effects of the institutional aspects involved.
Let Q denote the quorum, that is, the minimal percentage of the population necessary to bring on the referendum. The Q th percentile of the distribution Φ(b) of the bias bcall it b Q -then corresponds to the decisive marginal initiator. This citizen plays a role comparable to the politician's in the previous analysis. However, initiating a referendum is most likely not costless and we therefore assume that each citizen who participates in bringing on the initiative has to pay a fixed cost k. Taking into account these costs, the optimal decision rule for the marginal initiator is v *
as v(t) falls short of this threshold, the referendum is not initiated; once it reaches the threshold, it will be, provided of course that a referendum would pass at v * b Q ; otherwise, the marginal initiator will start the referendum process as soon as a successful passage of the referendum is possible, i.e. at v ≥ ρC.
We want to analyze the different aspects of how the quorum should be set. This institutional question is clearly independent of any single issue at hand. Instead, such constitutional rules will be determined ahead of time and should apply to all possible referenda. Since at the time when the constitution is written, the value v of any single issue to be decided by referendum is not yet known, we assume that the initial v 0 for each issue that is to be decided by a referendum is a random variable with distribution X (v 0 ) and support [v,v] . Assuming that the constitution's founding fathers aim is to maximize the expected utility of an average future voter, their objective is to maximize:
The four terms represent the expected continuation value of non-initiators and initiators, as well as the implementation value of non-initiators and initiators respectively. The first line contains the utility from relatively bad projects that are not immediately implemented, while the second line consists of those projects that are better than the critical threshold v * b Q already at the first time they arise and are therefore implemented immediately afterwards. Optimization over Q, or equivalently over b Q , leads to the following first order condition: 12
To understand this equation, consider what happens as we decrease the quorum or increase the bias of the marginal initiator. The first line collects the cost effects for those at the margin. If v > v * b Q and the referendum is initiated without their active support, then they save the cost k of participating in the initiative. That is, the total cost of initiating the referendum decreases. If v < v * b Q and the initiative does not proceed, then instead their continuation value jumps up via the value matching condition. The second line represents the marginal effects on the continuation values of the intra-marginal citizens due to the change in the implementation threshold brought about by the increase in b Q -note that dv * /db Q = −1 unless the referendum constraint is binding in which case it is zero. For people to the left (right) of the marginal initiator, the decrease in the implementation threshold decreases (increases) their continuation value as the threshold moves further away (closer) to their respective optima.
As a starting point, consider the limiting case where the cost k of initiating a referendum is zero. In this case, the first line in (18) vanishes and since the partial derivative of the value function is linear in b we can write:
where
Equation (19) can only be satisfied if the first term of the partical derivative in (20) is zero. This implies that b Q = avg (b) , that is, the average voter should be the marginal initiator as this maximizes utilitarian welfare. Note that such a high initiation threshold might make the actual referendum redundant. Now, consider an increase in the cost k. Clearly, the first line of (18) becomes positive and therefore the second part must be negative. Using the functional form of F (·, ·) the second part takes the form:
Keeping in mind that dv * /db Q is negative we see that b Q must exceed the average bias. That is, we have the plausible result that higher costs reduce the optimal quorum. In general, there is a trade-off between cost saving when we reduce the quorum, and an earlier implementation time for all proposals that are not very valuable; the smaller the quorum is, the earlier these projects will be implemented, which in expectation (and in the optimum) is bad for the average voter.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model of referendum timing that has a wide variety of applications, in particular to referenda about fundamental political changes like entry into the European Union or into a currency union, or a declaration of independence. In these situations, learning about payoffs from (not) undertaking the project is often an important effect that makes it optimal to delay decisions, just as for investments in the literature of investment under uncertainty. We have shown that, through a referendum that destroys the option value of waiting, a politician who is positively biased towards the project can force the median voter to implement the project earlier than it would be optimal for the median voter. The politician's power to implement a project before the time that is optimal for the median voter will be the larger, the more important learning is and for the longer the politician can commit to not holding a second referendum after a possible failure.
The problem that a positively biased politician calls a referendum too early from the median voter's point of view is exacerbated if the politician fears that he could lose power. In this case, the politician will be tempted to move even earlier than his optimal learning would imply. When the referendum is initiated by the population (instead of a politician), our model has implications for the determination of the optimal initiation quorum; a tradeoff occurs between the costs of initiation (which would favor a low quorum) and the effect that lower quorum will lead to more extremist timing decisions (which would favor a large quorum).
